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Tanabe’s Logic of the Specific and 
the Critique of the Global Village
JAMES W. HEISIG
T he philosophy of Tanabe Hajime, as yet little known outside the Japanese-reading world, is destined, I believe, to attract more and more attention as time goes on. Great injustice is done to Tanabe by 
treating him only as a Japanese thinker. Together with the philosophy 
of Nishida KitarO and Nishitani Keiji, his is a world-class philosophy. 
In one sense, the endorsement rolls effortless and unoffending off the 
tongue; in another, it is a hard verdict to swallow. But it is just this ver­
dict, in its thick and thin, that has me engrossed me in Tanabe's 
thought this past decade and more.
In a first and thin sense, to call these philosophers of the Kyoto 
school world-class is to say that they give to the world of their age the 
Japanese intellectual tradition at its best. If those raised in other modes 
of thought want to know Japan’s contribution, they do well to include 
these Kyoto philosophers in the picture. As twentieth-century minds, 
they deserve to take their place alongside the most respected representa­
tives of other intellectual histories. They belong in the ranks of Russell, 
Jaspers, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Ortega y Gassett, 
James, Whitehead, Croce, Aurobindo, and the like. The judgment is 
not simply the bloated bias of devoted disciples. Nor is it the ignorant 
flattery of foreign readers enchanted by the otherness of Japanese 
thinking or eager to defend the intellectual investment required to plow 
through these difficult works. It is a judgment of historical fact, and as 
such it has stood well the test of time and criticism both in Japan and
* The text of this essay is a translation o f a Japanese lecture delivered on 3 June 
1995 in Kyoto to  commemorate the 50th anniversary of the passing of Nishida KitarO. 
The original is tentatively scheduled to appear in Tetsugaku Kenkya 562 (October 
1996), published by the Kyoto Tetsugaku Kai.
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abroad. Still, this is the thin sense.
A second, thick sense is that in which Kyoto-school philosophy 
needs to be liberated from the confines of the culture and language that 
gave it birth in order to execute its full potential. It sees the audience of 
this philosophy as all those who gather on the world forum of ideas. It 
is therefore not just a collection of ideas that can be understood, criti­
cized, and applied only by, nor even primarily by, those educated in the 
same Japanese particularity. The thick sense of being world-class re­
moves the privilege of immunity from critique on cultural grounds. It 
also opens up the possibility of enhancing the role of the Kyoto school 
in history. At the same time, I think you will agree that the foreign read­
er comes at a disadvantage to understanding what Japan has done to 
philosophy, and that this disadvantage suggests certain limits of decen­
cy to the critique of what is, after all, distinctively Japanese. In that 
regard, the thin sense of Kyoto philosophy as representing the 
Japanese presence in the ranks of world intellectual history must never 
be brushed out of the landscape.
In this lecture, I would like to take up Tanabe’s logic of the specific 
as a standpoint from which to consider the consequences, at home and 
abroad, of twentieth-century Japanese thought stepping out onto the 
world forum. Although newer editions of philosophical encyclopedias 
have taken a turn towards eastern thinkers more generous than in the 
past, the conversion has yet to reach the proportions of the thick sense. 
There are reasons for this, and Tanabe’s logic of the specific, I suggest, 
helps us examine those reasons critically.
Let me at once add an important qualification. As far as I know, the 
suggestion of applying the logic of the specific to Japanese philosophy 
itself is not Tanabe’s, but mine. Not only did he not make the connec­
tion between his logic and Japanese thought explicit, he speculated on 
the contradictory conclusion that Japan’s specificity could provide a 
universal matrix for the other cultures of Asia. That he failed prodi­
gally during the course of Japan’s fifteen-year war with Asia to consult 
his own insight objectively1 is in part softened by his later repentance 
and reassessment of his own philosophical position. It is in the spirit,
1 I have spelled this out in greater detail in “ Tanabe’s Logic o f  the Specific and the 
Spirit o f  Nationalism,”  J. Heisig and J. Maraldo, eds.. Rude Awakenings: Zen, The 
K yoto  School, and the Question o f  Nationalism  (Honolulu: University o f  Hawaii 
Press, 1995), 255-88.
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if not the flesh, of that later “ metanoetics” that I offer my own reading 
of the originality and applicability of Tanabe’s logic of the specific. 
The primary backdrop against which I do so be the contemporary uni­
versal of the electronic age, the “ global village,” which has become 
something of a guiding fiction for the modem imagination.
THE ORIGINS OF THE SPECIES
In the background of the specific philosophical influences that com­
bined to inspire Tanabe to his new logic lies the fact that it was forged 
in the crucible of a culture that had traditionally resisted the moral 
implications of its own historical conditioning and relativity vis-^-vis 
other peoples and cultures. When Western philosophy reached Japan 
around the last quarter of the nineteenth century, it did not flow natu­
rally into the deep channels of a perennial philosophy or a collective 
awareness of the distinction between universal truth and vernacular 
representations of it. It streamed broad and shallow over a terrain 
unprepared for its deeper currents, washing occasionally into the main­
stream of Buddhist thought with thinkers like Kiyozawa Manshi and 
Inoue Enryd, but generally no more than an object of curiosity. 
Nishida’s genius was that he tried to conduct the philosophical tradi­
tion of the West into channels dug fresh and to the measure of the 
modem Japanese mind. From his ideas of pure experience, active intui­
tion, and self-awareness to his logic of locus, Nishida was trying to 
construct concrete modes of thought able critically to receive the best 
that human reflection had to offer and to transmute it into the wisdom 
needed for Japan to take its place in the world.
Although Tanabe inherited this concern as a given, it is not until his 
idea of the logic of the specific that we see him clearly appropriating its 
fundamental inspiration in an original contribution. When Nishida in­
troduced his logic of locus in 1926 in an attempt to bring the notion of 
absolute nothingness into clearer philosophical relief, Tanabe did not 
follow suit. Instead he began to work on the idea of “ absolute media­
tion,” which he had distilled out of his reading of Hegel. In a 1930 
essay openly critical of the senior Nishida, he presented his idea as an 
alternative way to incorporate the idea of eastern nothingness into 
philosophy. That, coupled with his previous conviction that the politi­
cal dimension needed to be pulled out of the shadows and into the light
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of speculative philosophy, seems to have provided him the stimulus for 
announcing in 1934 his idea of the “ logic of the specific.”
Judgments of disciples have remained divided regarding the confron­
tation between Nishida and Tanabe over their respective logics. For my 
part, I feel that Nishida and his sympathizers overestimated the extent 
to which Nishida had already disposed of Tanabe’s originality in his 
own categories. I am tempted to try here to dress that conclusion up in 
suitable texts and argument. The time allotted me gives me no choice 
but to leave it standing naked and defenseless before you. In any case, 
we may perhaps agree that their animosities drew strength from the 
affinities of that deeper aim of making philosophy a vehicle to draw the 
whole wide world out of Japan and draw Japan out into the whole 
wide world.
That having been said, it remains to lay out as simply as I can what I 
see as the chief marks of originality in Tanabe’s new logic. Since I will 
be composing a position that ranges across thirty years and more of 
writings, a word about the way Tanabe worked out his position seems 
in order.
Not a few commentators have objected to Tanabe’s attempts to bias 
his resume of earlier positions in the light of later insights. Without 
going too deeply into the “ origin of his species,” I would like to qua­
lify this criticism somewhat. In early presentations, Tanabe himself 
gave two primary motives for developing a new logic. First was a prac­
tical concern with “ seeking out rational grounds to the controls im­
posed by the society as a nation on its individual members.” Second 
was what he felt as the need to revise general logic in the strict sense of 
the word.2 Regarding this latter aim, Tanabe did make a number of 
attempts to clarify the origins of his idea and also to modify or retract 
earlier positions in response to critics.3 *5 Regarding the former aim, 
however, he behaved rather differently in the formative years of the 
idea, omitting mention of his critics and their criticisms. This is on the 
one hand, I believe, to Tanabe’s generally Darwinian habit of argumen-
2 (“Clarifying the Logic of the Specific” ], [Col­
lected Works o f  Tanabe Hajime, hereafter cited as THZ] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobd,
1964), 6:466.
5 In addition to the essay mentioned in the note above, see also his
5 (“ Response to Criticisms o f the Logic of the Specific,”] THZ 6.
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tation, which seems to hide from his reader the accumulated contradic­
tions of his thinking by making periodic adjustments. His ideas unfold 
themselves forwards, the fittest surviving and the rest falling aside or 
remaining as mere vestiges, as if by natural selection. When he returns 
to the same theme again, he evaluates its descent only in terms of what 
has survived. It is always the latest stage that kept his attention. So 
long as he was moving forwards, the ontogeny did not detain him.
On the other hand, in the case of the logic of the specific we cannot 
discount the political situation in Japan where critical reflection on 
social structures had to contend with military escapades abroad and a 
growing totalitarianism at home. In that mood, the philosophical lan­
guage of the Kyoto philosophers lost its innocence and even the most 
abstract notions were overlaid with meanings often far from their 
authors’ intent. That Tanabe chose to deal with the practical, moral, 
and religious dimensions of the state philosophy in such circumstances 
only drew more attention to his writings, and in some measure­
enough to prompt him to call for a repentance of the philosophical 
enterprise itself—derailed his primary aim from his broader philosophi­
cal convictions.
If we are to draw attention to the logic of the species as Tanabe’s con­
tribution to world philosophy, this derailing is far less interesting than 
is the fundamental inspirations behind it. Of such matters I speak with 
only timid authority, but I believe that the lasting originality we find 
in the logic of the specific is not the originality of a unified, fully self­
identical system, the “ pure logic’’ that he sought as a secondary aim, 
but a method of thinking, and that this thinking is not intrinsically 
bound to the particular interpretations of the Japanese state to which 
Tanabe first applied it.
THE PERSPECTIVE OF TANABE’S LOGIC OF THE SPECIFIC
In order to locate as precisely as possible the defining traits of Tanabe’s 
logic, I would single out, in a sequence of my own device, four inter­
locking and defining propositions that give us the dimensions of his 
new perspective.
1, The logic o f  the specific marks a shift from  the formal, syllogistic 
function o f  species to an ontological description o f absolute media­
tion.
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The first step in Tanabe’s reinterpretation of the notion of the specific 
is to dislodge the concept of species from its obligation to formal logic 
where it served as a mere category of classification pinched between 
the universal and the individual. To Tanabe it seemed that in compari­
son with the universal “ One”  and the individuals that make up the 
“ many,” the traditional role of species was merely ancillary: on the one 
hand, a way to group the many into units smaller than the great One; 
on the other, a way to break the immensity of the One up into unities 
larger than the mere individual. The reason it was so confined, as 
Tanabe points out, was that species lacked the ontological possibilities 
of the universal and the individual. True parity for the specific would 
require that it be seen as something fully real.
Tanabe made no secret of his debt to Hegel in his mature thought. 
The period immediately before the logic of the species was preoccupied 
with Hegel’s dialectic and led him to strike out in a new direction of his 
own. All vagaries of his reading of Hegel aside, perhaps most im­
portant of all, he took from Hegel the idea of logic reflecting reality not 
as a mirror before an object, but as belonging to the same unfolding 
process. This entails two things. First, as Hegel saw, when the dimen­
sion of history is brought into the picture, the two-valued logic of the 
grammatical syllogism gives way to a dialectic in which negation and 
affirmation work incessantly to make the world, and our under­
standing of it, over and over again. In place of the principle of non­
contradiction, he proposed that logic be grounded on a principle of 
absolute mediation. Tanabe concludes:
The logic of the specific is a dialectical logic, . . . both a logic 
and a denial of logic. The self-contradiction of existence and 
the reversibility of affirmation-in-negation and negation-in- 
affirmation cannot be expressed, still less, described, in terms 
of a logic that takes the laws of identity and non-contradic­
tion as fundamental principles. . . . Existence destroys and 
transcends the logic of identity. . . .*
The reference to the denial of logic is Tanabe’s way of insisting that 
the logic of the specific is always a logic of an evolving reality, a way of 
seeing that only makes sense when it is engaged in seeing.
4 (“ The Dialectic of the Logic of Species**], THZ 7:261-2.
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Second, in making absolute mediation a logical principle more fun­
damental and fairer to reality than the principle of non-contradiction, 
Tanabe does not merely mean that reality is full of contradictions that 
require a continual give-and-take among our ideas about it, but that 
the very mediation that propels history through time as an interrelated 
totality itself belongs to reality. It was at this point that he struck on 
the idea of reinvigorating the syllogistic function of “ species” as a 
link that joins the universal and the individual (the “ Socrates is a man” 
that enables “ all men will die” to be applied to the individual case as 
“ Socrates will die” ). This formal mediating function, he thought, 
might be extended beyond the abstract proposition to point to the actu­
al ontological reality of the many participating severally in the One.
The direction in which Tanabe took his conviction that mediation is 
real and not just an abstracted reflection of the real, is as different from 
Nishida’s logic of place as it is from what Hegel does with the same con­
viction in the Science o f Logic. Tanabe’s rejection of Nishida’s “ self­
identity of absolute contradictories” as slipping into a contemplation 
of a static, quasi-Plotinean One has to be read today, I think, less as a 
fair appraisal of his senior colleague than as his way of underlining this 
utter reality he wished to grant to mediation. His departure from 
Hegel, however, is more studied, though the chronology is not al­
together clear to me.
Hegel saw logical mediation as a misty reflection of reality, a self­
estrangement of Thought from itself, a temporary detour away from 
phenomenal being in search of the essential substrate of things, which 
would eventually wind its way back to the self-consciousness of Spirit. 
In this way he argued that logic needs to be freed of its traditional 
attachment to abstract notions of the universal and the specific as mere 
names for common features shared by concrete individuals in order to 
show Thought functioning in the unfolding of history as a concrete 
universal and a concrete specificity.
In 1946, Tanabe tells us that his idea of a logic of the specific was 
“ originally suggested by Hegel’s objective Spirit.” 5 Despite a small
5 He states this in the opening paragraph of the “The Dialectic of the Logic of Spe­
cies,” THZ 7:253-4. See also Takeuchi Yoshinori, “ Recollections of Professor 
Tanabe,” in J. Heisig and T. Unno, eds., The Religious Philosophy o f  Tanabe Hajime 
(Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1990), 7-10.
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number of references to this in his earlier essays, it seems to me that the 
critical catalyst did not come from his reading of Hegel at all, but 
rather from a decisive stimulus to break his idea of absolute mediation 
away from the imposing shadow of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit.6 This 
brings us to our next proposition.
2. Specificity is defined primarily as the socio-cultural substratum of 
historical peoples.
Without the concrete leavings of history, the claim that mediation is as 
real as the real things that interact with each other sounds more like 
a rhetorical flourish than a critical statement. There is no reason why 
dialectical language at all should be less liable to read its own biases 
into the phenomenal world than static, two-valued logic is. This criti­
cism, which the reader of Hegel’s richly experiential and historical 
Phenomenology and Philosophy o f  Right can hardly avoid lodging 
against the dry and ethereal Logic, did not escape Tanabe.7 As a result,
6 1 must admit I have trouble understanding this claim as far as the purely logical
structure o f  the scheme goes. Tanabe’s first outline o f  the logic o f  the specific opens 
with a brief critique o f  Hegel’s idea lack o f  concreteness in the Science o f  Logic, and 
makes a brief allusion to the Phenomenology o f  M ind. But in reading through the 
third part o f  the Logic, where the idea o f  the concrete universal is discussed and where 
Hegel makes his case for the cooperative interplay o f universal, species, and individ­
ual, I have to say I find nothing terribly suggestive at all. Tanabe’s idea is that the three 
parts o f  the Logic correspond to logics o f  the specific, the individual, and the universal 
respectively. I know o f no one else that reads Hegel this way, and in fact Tanabe him­
self may have realized this later, as his main point here—that the logic o f  general predi­
cation found in part 1 (Being) * "leaves no room for doubt that it corresponds to a logic 
o f the species” —is not repeated in later writings. See (“ A Logic o f  So­
cial Existence” ], THZ 6:71-4. On the other hand, the influence o f  the Philosophy o f  
Right on Tanabe’s development o f  the idea o f  the nation is both explicit and to the 
point in his early essays.
7 In addition to comments in the opening pages o f  the 1932 essay mentioned in note
4, he suggests in a 1938 essay i3 v  b (‘‘Logic from Kant to
Hegel” ] that Hegel’s critique o f  Kant needs to be complemented by a reverse critique in 
which Kant’s concrete “ Platonic” practical reason could challenge the abstract and 
“ Plotinean” aspects o f Hegel’s Absolute Spirit (see especially THZ 5:400-4). There he 
fills out an idea that he alludes to in a 1931 essay [“ Dialectics and Hegel’s 
Philosophy” ] (THZ 3:134). In addition, his longer essays on Hegel at that time often 
refer to taking the ethical and historical dimension o f  Hegel more seriously than Hegel 
himself had.
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he could not propose his principle of absolute mediation as a logic— 
that is, as a way of seeing reality—without hr st mooring it in the tem­
poral-historical process. This was the inaugural role he assigned to the 
idea of the specific.
In the background of his first essay on the logic of the species one 
can hardly fail to hear the echoes of the contemporary clamor among 
intellectuals for greater attention to concrete social praxis. Tanabe was 
aware that he was about something very contemporary, and he even 
takes a moment to pardon Hegel for having lived at an age where he 
could know no better.8 The direct catalyst for turning an ear to this 
concern with the social was his awakening to the importance of socio* 
logy for philosophy, and the most important of these influences was 
Bergson’s Two Sources o f Morality and Religion. This in turn allowed 
him to bring to the surface a concern that is already present in previous 
writings, namely the restoration of the moral dimension of philosophy. 
“ It is in morality,” he writes, “ that we find philosophy’s vital immedia­
cy.” 9 Influences aside, the fact is that specific social praxis lay at the 
heart of the logic of the specific. It is the mediating force that binds the 
individual human being to the universal human race and that brings 
into relationship the absolute negational role of religion and the 
affirmative exercise of individual free will. The locus of the specific, 
Tanabe realized, must be sought in the societal dimension of the 
human, namely in human society. The question was where.
In order to play the role of the guarantor of concreteness, the 
specificity of the specific had itself to be both synchronic and diachron­
ic: it had to refer to a particular epoch but also refer to what unfolds 
across epochs. In other words, its specificity needed to stand on a mid­
dle ground between the universal history of the human race and the 
individual history of men and women. Moreover, like the Christian 
Hegel, but unlike Nishida whose logic of locus frequently opened out 
into Buddhist metaphors of the wider natural world, Tanabe’s logic of 
the specific seems to have assumed that the primary sense of history 
was that of human history.10 That Nishida’s logic tilted always towards
8 “ A  Logic o f Social Existence,”  T H Z  6:74.
9  “ A  Logic o f Social Existence,”  6:166.
10 I understand this to be present in his somewhat oblique response to the criticism 
of Takahashi Satomi that the proper locus for absolute mediation is nature. See 
“ Response to Criticisms of the Logic of the Specific” ! T H Z  6:406-7.
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self-awareness and Tanabe’s towards moral praxis is hardly accidental. 
All of these assumptions combined in Tanabe’s decision: the specific 
would be identified as the concrete and immediate reality of the ethnic 
“ closed society.”
The idea of the closed society was, of course, Bergson’s. The free­
dom of the Japanese language to omit distinction between singulars 
and plurals, together with Tanabe’s own failure to give concrete exam­
ples, leaves a certain ambiguity, but there seems little doubt that it was 
Japan that he had in mind as a historical model. Now given the nega­
tive connotations of referring to a society as “ closed” and the implicit 
reference to Japan, the immediate problem for Tanabe was how to 
introduce a process of conversion to a more “ open”  society. This was 
the stimulus behind his quest for locating a rational foundation for 
social existence. Throughout the years in which the logic of the species 
took shape, roughly 1934 to 1941, Tanabe chose to pursue this problem 
by focusing his attention on the most obvious rationalization of social 
existence at hand—the modern nation.
In contrast to so-called primitive or totemic societies, where the in­
dividual is absorbed into the group’s will to preserve an disseminate 
its own life, the modem European nation is built on the seventeenth­
century ideal of shifting the accent from the group’s “ will to life”  to the 
“ will to reason and morality”  of the individuals as the political atoms 
that make it up. Tanabe saw the nation’s essence to consist in a “ will to 
authority”  that brings a kind of molecular, rational unity to the whole. 
Accepting Hegel’s idea that “ membership in the nation is the highest 
duty of the individual,”  Tanabe adds that the essence of being a nation 
consists in opening up what ethnic specificity had closed, or as he puts 
it “ elevating its individuals to the status of universal individuals.” 11
The open society that Tanabe saw as the moral vocation of the 
nation follows Bergson’s definition here in introducing humanity as 
the generic universal that uplifts individuals out of the limitations of 
specific, closed societies. But at the same time Tanabe took an 
important step away from Bergson in refusing, at least initially, to put 
all talk of “ human society,” “ human nation,”  or “ world community” 
on the same level of immediate reality as the specific substrate of ethnic­
ity. He saw it rather as a negation of the specific, a kind of permanent
11 “ A  Logic o f  Social Existence,** T H Z  6:155.
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protestant principle that saved particular nations from inflicting their 
own cultural specificity on others in the name of universal humanity.
In a word, Tanabe saw the immediate reality of ethnic specificity as 
only a provisional form given to the social dimension of the human, 
but he could not conceive of any reformation or transformation taking 
place outside of the concrete structures of particular nations. Although 
he insisted that this does not imply any particular form of government 
or even any particular ideal of social structure, he could not avoid refer­
ence to participation in politics in general, and eventually reference to 
participation in the politics of Japan’s wartime government. Looking 
back on these events after the war, he claimed that this is precisely what 
he did not mean by his new logic. We can take Tanabe at his word only 
on the assumption that he did not really mean what he wrote. His later 
writings seem to me to support just such an assumption.
3. Socio-cultural specificity is defined as a nonrationality that lies at 
the base o f every human attempt to ground social existence rationally.
On first hearing, the orchestration of the nation as a social reality 
entrusted with introducing universality into ethnic specificity sounds off- 
key. The surface melody criticizing Japan as a society closed in on its 
own specificity harmonizes poorly with echoes of a colonial mentality 
running in subtle counterpoint. Was it not in the name of the Japanese 
nation that he encouraged young students on their way to the war­
fields? But at the same time, was not his distinction between the 
nation and ethnic specificity meant to choke the cultural supremacists 
on their own medicine? Looking back after the war at his logic of the 
species, Tanabe claimed that “ my motive was to take up the philosophi­
cal question of racialism that was emerging at the time.” 12 While we 
have to wonder why he did not make that motive clearer in his original 
writings, I find nothing directly contradicting the claim. In any case, if 
the logic of the specific stands or falls on Tanabe’s idea of the nation, 
then it falls. And fall it did. During a five-year period of silence after 
the war he left it flat on its face. To pick it up again he needed to dis­
tance social praxis from its former association with building up the na­
tion. This is what his later writings do.
Insofar as Tanabe’s logic revolved around the primary aim of seek-
12 THZ 7:253.
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ing rational grounds to the organization of individuals into a society, 
the idea of socio-cultural specificity could not avoid defining itself in 
terms of theories of social contract, ideals of democracy, and the cri­
tique of bourgeois society. But by the same token, as Tanabe himself 
admits, “ Whether one is talking of nation or ethnic people or social 
class, they are all located in the position of a specific in contrast to the 
totality of humanity on the one hand and particular individuals on the 
other.” 13 The admission is important because his long attention to the 
role of the nation tends to obscure what it shares in common with the 
ethnic closed society, namely the essential and ultimately irradicable 
nonrationality of the specific. Only in bringing this aspect into clearer 
relief can we draw the line in the logic of the specific to Tanabe’s later 
work and from there to our world today.14
13 “ A Logic of Social Existence,” THZ 6:60.
14 Here I part company with Himi Kiyoshi’s immensely helpful studies of the
logic of the specific, i?— [Studies in the Philosophy o f
Tanabe} (Tokyo: Hokuju, 1990). For Himi, after Philosophy as Metanoetics the logic 
of the specific is no more than a smoldering ember that Tanabe never again managed to 
fan into flame.
15 THZ 7:257-8.
The key to drawing this line appears in a 1946 essay on “ The Logic 
of the Specific as Dialectics,”  where Tanabe contrasts the positive and 
negative dimensions of the specific in new terms.15 Negatively, as 
before, the specificity of the socio-cultural substratum is said to limit the 
individual, breaking the will to moral action in the name of ideals com­
ing from outside of the ethnic group. Its totality is nonrational, oppos­
ing all who oppose it with the aim of mediating it through rational 
reflection, presenting itself as superior precisely because it is immediate 
and unreflected reality. Positively, however, it is also now said to be the 
foundation for culture, which arises through a process of education 
among the members of a society. In this sense, the unreflected immedia­
cy of the specific society is transfigured into a conscious and mutual 
mediation among individuals. In place of earlier emphasis on the 
nation in contrast to the oppressive tendencies of ethnic or racial identi­
ty, the positive dimension reemerges in the context of a moral culture 
somehow seen to be superior to, though not exclusive of, political obli­
gations to the nation.
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Already in the early stages of the logic of the specific it is clear that 
Tanabe’s insistence on absolute mediation as the only way to describe 
reality ultimately left him dissatisfied with Hegel’s principle that “ the 
real is rational and the rational is real.”  If there is rationality in the 
socio-cultural specificity that mediates a relationship between universal 
humanity and individual human beings, it would not do to chalk this 
up to the mere fact that ethnic groups exist. Rational attempts to create 
government and to rule by moral or religious ideals were always for 
Tanabe an imposition of human reason, not an inevitable law of 
nature. The interplay between the individual and society was simply 
too varied, too vital, to be fully rationalized. Quite the contrary, as 
the living soul of a people, the specific substratum that bound a people 
together into a socio-cultural unit was not only nonrational in the sense 
of being unreasonable or imperfectly reflected, but also nonrational in 
the sense of posing immediate limits to reason. Once we grant that this 
specificity is not a mere classifying category or a moral option that one 
can accept or reject, but an indispensable dimension of the human as 
a social being, the tables turn on Hegelian social philosophy: the non­
rational becomes the foundation of the real and hence of the rational 
as well.
In pointing out the positive side of the specific, one should note that 
Tanabe never compromised his abiding distrust in the tendency of the 
specific towards herd thinking, collective superstition, and simply 
sloppy thinking. Nothing in his writings backs down from his belief in 
the irrevocable inhumanity of simple blind obedience to habits of 
thought inherited in the structures of language or cultural mores. 
Never one to honor common sense unduly, Tanabe located the ten­
dency to think badly in the group and the overcoming of that tendency 
in private discipline. This was the original sense of the term in his first 
essays on the logic of the specific, and appeared again in redoubled 
force in the Metanoetics, where he announced that the irrationality of 
the specific was something he had personally “ suffered” and hence 
hard to explain to those who lacked the experience of wartime Japan.16 
The disenchantment at waking up to one’s own inability to critique col­
lective patterns of thought taking shape in one’s own time is, of course, 
a common enough experience, and belongs as much to the victors of
16 THZ 7:259-60.
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the war as to the defeated.
At the same time, revaluing the nonrationality of the specific seems 
to have drawn his attention to elements in vernacular wisdom and com­
mon sense that limit our attempts to be rational and give them a practi­
cal and objective raison d’etre in time and space that mere private reflec­
tion cannot. No doubt old age and the approach of death aided this 
positive appreciation of the nonrational side of the specific substratum. 
Together, if it is not out of place for me to say so, they help understand 
the unaccustomed tinge of piety one sees in his later work.
4. Specificity’s ultimate foundation is not the being o f  historical 
relativity, but absolute nothingness.
If there is a fundamental nonrationality at the heart of human society 
which it is our ambivalent duty as free, conscious individuals both to 
overcome and to respect; that is to say, if the specificity of social exis­
tence is both a spur to our innate drive to salvation from ignorance and 
a guarantee that we shall never be saved, then this aporia would 
amount to a final, irrevocable law of existence. Tanabe’s agreement 
with existential philosophy on this score (in particular Heidegger and 
more so Jaspers) only makes sense in the context of his religious trans­
formation of the pursuit of salvation.17 The cornerstone of his thought 
he shared with others of the Kyoto school, and it comes simply to this: 
the immediate reality of the human as a thinking social being, does 
not ultimately rest on any higher state or form of being but on an 
absolute nothingness that at once embraces and penetrates the inherent 
contradictions and relative nothingness at the limits of being.18 In 
Tanabe’s case, nothingness became the “ subject”  of the absolute medi­
ation at work in the world of being. As such it was the principle behind 
the conversion of individuals only because it was also the principle 
behind the transformation of the socio-cultural specificity that gives 
individuality its immediacy. His language is dense, but clear:
Insofar as nothingness is nothingness, it is incapable of func-
17 [“ The Limits of Existentialist Philosophy’’], THZ 7:3-24.
11 This distinction between relative and absolute nothingness, the core of Nishitani's 
magnum opus, Religion and Nothingness, is referred to by Tanabe in 
[Existenz, Love, Praxis], THZ 9:283-4.
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tioning on its own. Being can function only because it is not 
nothingness. . . . The individual is mediated by nothingness 
by a self-negating mediation of the specific in which the being 
of the specific functions as a nothing-in-being, thus making 
the individual a being-in-nothingness.19
I throw up my hands at the very suggestion of telescoping into a few 
lines how the idea of absolute nothingness functioned in Tanabe’s 
thought. I should have to read and re-read too much to speak with 
any confidence on such matters. Still, it is an essential ingredient to the 
logic of the specific and I feel I must say something of it.
In the logic of the specific, absolute nothingness appears primarily as 
the religious dimension to social existence. Tanabe rejected as mere 
“ bias” Bergson’s idea that religion is of necessity mystical.20 For him, 
religion was always a cooperative via salvationis in which the self­
awakening of the individual could never be authentic without an ac­
companying overflow into the moral sphere of social praxis. Even the 
via mystica was always a via specifica trod in the midst of the concrete 
human community. This was the way in which he worked the religious 
dimension into his understanding of the nation. Furthermore, at least 
from the time of his logic of the specific, he was consistent in his claim 
that the function of religion is one of absolute negation.
Religion negates the nation in both a practical and an ontological 
sense. Practically, it is a way of salvation from the specific, since 
Tanabe uses the Buddhist term for “ unconditional acceptance” or his 
own version “ absolute acceptance.”  Ontologically, it negates not only 
the nation, but all immediate forms of socio-cultural specificity, as well 
as the self-subsistent being of individuals and the claim of the human 
race to universality. In negating all the affirmations of morality, rea­
son, and power that function through the concrete mediation of the 
individual, the specific, and the generic in human social existence, the 
negation of religion is an absolute negation. As negation, it is not so 
much a denial of the fact of mediation as a denial of the affirmation 
that the mediation that binds society together is actually the work of 
the members who make it up. As absolute, the negation prevents the
” THZ 7:261.
20 “ A Logic of Social Existence,” 6:147.
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practical working out of salvation from being identified with a particu­
lar structures, which would land the state in some form of theocracy, 
which for Tanabe was no more than an absolutizing of the specific.21
21 “ A  Logic o f Social Existence,”  6:149-53.
22 T H Z  7:258.
23 The suggestion is H im i’s, Studies in the Philosophy o f  Tanabe, 168.
24 A t the prodding o f Takahashi Satomi, Tanabe realized early on that there was a 
problem with exempting the specificity o f society and nation from the rule o f absolute 
mediation. But as the term he used for immediate did not on the surface indicate un­
mediated, it was not until he dislodged the nation from its central position in the logic 
of the specific that he reached a satisfactory solution to the criticism.
In late writings the religious meaning of mediation gets stronger and 
clearer in proportion as the nationalistic side pales and fades into the 
background. Specific society, insofar as it closes itself off from the com­
munity of other societies, is seen as the self-alienation of the generic 
unity of absolute nothingness. Religiously, the specific is the locus for 
the enlightened engagement in the world (the relative gensO, to follow 
his Pure Land terminology), where absolute nothingness works to save 
the members of a society through mutual love and cooperation. “ As 
the mediator of the totality of nothingness in the world of being, the 
individual becomes nothing and thereby becomes the convenient means 
for mutual instruction and salvation.” 22
But the role of religion in working for the self-awareness of generic 
unity is not only to bind the individuals within a specific society 
together but to open them to the wider world outside of their own com­
munity. In the same way that Tanabe adopts the Christian symbol of 
the communio sanctorum to speak of the relations among individuals, 
there is at least a hint that he had the Christian idea of the specific 
“ local church” in mind when speaking of the religious dimension of 
the nation in relation to the ideal “ universal church” of the entire hu­
man family.23 In this scheme the nation loses the character of simple 
“ immediacy” that Tanabe had given it earlier and in its place becomes 
simply a “ convenient means” for working out a salvation that draws 
one across specific boundaries.24
In spite of this reorientation of the logic of the specific, and despite 
his insistence that “ culture worship . . . is a symptom of the decadence
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of culture,” 25 it is surprising to see that Tanabe never recanted his earli­
er attempts to elevate the Japanese emperor religiously to the status of 
“ avatar of Absolute Nothingness.” 26 At the height of Japan’s transfor­
mation into a military state, Tanabe envisioned the emperor rising up 
symbolically out of the nation of mutually mediated beings to 
represent the higher reality in whose power all beings are ultimately 
joined one to another. His motives for repeating this idea, substantially 
unchanged, as late as 1947 are hard to fathom. At most we can say that 
as Tanabe’s religious reflections drove his logic of the specific further 
and further away from the idea of the nation, they also overshadowed 
his curious attachment to finding a place of honor for the emperor in 
the logic. If there was any vacancy left, it was more than filled by the 
figures of Shinran and Jesus in whom Tanabe recognized true religious 
“ cosmopolitans”  rising above the epoch-specific conditions of their ori­
gins.
Several years ago at an International Zen Symposium on “ Religion 
and Ethics in the Contemporary World” held here in Kyoto, Ueda 
Shizuteru ended his concluding talk with the suggestion that the proper 
standpoint for religion in the world was not one of transcendental 
aloofness—“ 6,000 feet beyond good and evil,” as Nietzsche put it— 
nor of “ two feet planted firmly on the ground,” but a standpoint “ one 
inch off the ground.” 27 The phrase, said to characterize the twelfth­
century poet and monk SaigyO, seems to me just right to describe 
Tanabe’s final position towards the specificity of social existence: 
always at enough of a distance to keep his presence of mind, but always 
close enough to keep from becoming absentminded.
THE VIRTUAL REALITY OF THE GLOBAL VILLAGE
As I mentioned at the outset, Tanabe’s logic of the specific is not essen­
tially a set of rules for inference or categories for classifying data. It is 
a critical perspective from which to frame questions about the world,
23 Philosophy as Metanoetics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), lxi.
26 As late as 1947 he published an essay, (“ The Urgent Task of Political 
Philosophy” ] defending the emperor as the symbol of absolute nothingness.
27 “The Existence of Man: One Inch Off the Ground/* Zen Buddhism Today 
(Kyoto: Kyoto Seminar for Religious Philosophy, 1990), 170-1.
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in particular the human world, around us. Accordingly, it is a logic 
that grows and changes not primarily through dialogue with philosophi­
cal tradition but through contact with what it is questioning. And 
because of this, it is doomed forever to turn back on itself to question 
the biases of its own specificity. As a view on a radically historical and 
dialectical reality, the logic of the specific is always a question to itself. 
To set it aside simply because of the specific circumstances in which it 
grew, or because of the oversights that accompanied its adoption, is to 
subject oneself to its central criticism. In this sense, once the principle 
of specificity has been understood—though Tanabe’s is hardly the only 
way of doing so—there is no escaping it. It may be dismissed as tauto­
logy or common sense, but its insight, once awakened to, is irreversible.
Late twentieth-century civilization’s culture o f 4‘survival of the tech­
nologically fittest” has conditioned us to distinguish what is valuable 
from what is worthless in terms of novelty v. obsolescence, surfeit v. 
sufficiency, efficiency v. moderation; and in the process has created a 
vaster graveyard for lifeless religious and philosophical ideas than any 
civilization in history. Before we ask whether Tanabe’s logic of the 
specific deserves to be buried there, I think it only fair that we slip on 
its lenses and have a look at the beliefs in whose name this transforma­
tion of the collective imagination has taken place. In what remains of 
this lecture, I propose to consider the idea of the ‘‘global village”  and 
to show how Tanabe’s logic of the specific, at least in the terms I have 
outlined it, reinforces the suspicion that most of us have known in our 
hearts all along: that the village is not global at all but hopelessly 
parochial.
The idea of the ‘‘global village,” for all the fascination it evokes, is 
no more than a guiding fiction for a certain model of social develop­
ment. Not only does it not exist in reality for the vast majority of the 
planet, it is in fact no more than a virtual reality even for who those 
count themselves its ranking citizens. In Japan, ‘‘belonging to the 
global village” has much the same meaning as “ internationalization” 
or “ cross-cultural communication.”  The surface contradiction of the 
words global and village does not startle or exhilarate quite the way it 
does in English, nor does its source seem to matter very much.
We owe the term, in fact, to the rare ingenuity of the Canadian 
literary critic, Marshall McLuhan, who introduced it nearly thirty years 
ago in these words:
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Ours is a brand-new world of allatonceness. 4 ‘Time” has 
ceased, “ space” has vanished. We now live in a global vil­
lage . . .  a simultaneous happening. We are back in acoustic 
space. We have begun again to structure the primordial feel­
ing, the tribal emotions from which a few centuries of literacy 
divorced us.28
. . . Visual culture lives by classification and labels and catego­
ries. Electrically, the involvement of everybody in everybody 
seems to be returning us to an Oriental condition of acoustic 
involvement and tribal responsibilities.29
Esoteric as those words sounded a generation ago, they ring much 
more reasonable today, and make experiential sense to “ the commu­
nity of users on the internet.” It is as if the very nonrationality of tribal 
specificity that Tanabe saw as closing society is now being experienced 
as opening it. Already in 1964 McLuhan had envisioned the return to a 
collective yet paradoxically “ open” tribal mentality that the electronic 
worldwide web signals:
Men are suddenly nomadic gatherers of knowledge, nomadic 
as never before, informed as never before, free from fragmen­
tary specialization as never before; since with electricity we 
extend our central nervous systems globally, instantly inter­
relating every experience.30
But as exuberant as McLuhan sounds at one moment over the new 
global interconnectedness electronic media makes possible, at the next 
he laments the extent to which our awareness of what is happening to 
us lags behind. Regarding our tendency to think of the new electronic 
technology as simply an improved version of earlier machinery, he 
observes that “ when a new technology strikes a society, the most natural 
reaction is to clutch at the immediately preceding period for familiar
u  Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium is the Message: A n Inventory 
o f  Effects (New York: Bantam, 1967), 63.
*  From a letter I received from McLuhan dated 20 June 1967.
*  Understanding Media: The Extensions o f  Man (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 
358.
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and comfortable images.” 31 What Jung had to say of the psychology 
of the slave was not lost on his assessment of the impact of electronic 
tools on our freedoms:
Every Roman was surrounded by slaves. The slave and his 
psychology flooded ancient Italy, and every Roman became 
inwardly a slave. Living constantly in the atmosphere of 
slaves, he became infected with their psychology. No one can 
shield himself from this unconscious influence.32
Indeed, McLuhan was one of the first to announce the expropriation 
of the freedom to listen that was entailed in the acceptance of the me­
dia on a mass scale:
It would seem that there is some sense of compulsion among 
the marketers to assume the appearance of Little Red Riding 
Hood's granny. But this fear of detection is groundless. The 
modem Little Red Riding Hood, reared on singing commer­
cials, has no objection to being eaten by the wolf. “ Freedom 
to Listen,”  in a world where effective expression via news­
paper or radio is reserved only for a tiny minority, is freedom 
to put up or shut up.33
McLuhan’s oxymoron global village is not just a neologism but an 
attempt to accent the break in social structure. It was his way of denying 
just the clutch at the past and of hoping for an increase of conscious 
freedom. As it turns out, the willingness to put up with virtual reality 
has far from disappeared and the globalization of the tribal society is 
its prime example.
” Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, War and Peace in the Global Village (New 
York: Bantam, 1968), 126. I cannot resist adding a comment here. Lacking a type­
writer culture, Japan managed to avoid educating a generation o f  children on com­
puters with teachers who thought o f  them basically as only more efficient typewriters. 
Unfortunately, this advantage is more than offset by an obligatory school system 
that inflicts routines and examination procedures whose attachment to the modes o f  
thought inherited from the industrial revolution is almost religious.
“  “ Woman in Europe,”  The Collected Works o f  C . G. Jung (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1964), 10:121.
n  M. McLuhan, The Mechanical Bride: Folklore o f  Industrial Man (London: Rout­
ledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), 21.
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On this point, it takes only minor adjustments of vocabulary to 
introduce Tanabe’s logic of the specific into the picture here. As I have 
said, Tanabe was not given to draw on concrete examples from 
everyday life to argue the necessity of social praxis in philosophy. In 
this sense he is the exact opposite of McLuhan. What the two have in 
common, however, is a distrust of any universal, categorical “ moral 
law within” as a foundation for ethical decisions and in its place an 
unrelenting stress on the need for self-awareness of the concrete foun­
dations of the social world.34 For McLuhan understanding media as 
“ extension” of the human mind and body across time and space is the 
cornerstone for morality in the global village. For Tanabe, the reform 
of society rested on awakening to absolute nothingness as the basis 
for the absolute interconnectedness of all persons into a single human 
community. As alien as their phrasings seem from one another, there 
are striking resemblances. Permit me one last citation from McLuhan 
to illustrate the similarity, before returning to Tanabe’s critique. 
McLuhan remarks how not only technological advances but technologi­
cal disasters reinforce the interrelatedness of the global village in sick­
ness and in health:
34 See my essay, “The Self That is Not a Self,”  J. Heisig and T. Unno, The 
Religious Philosophy o f  Tanabe Hajime: The Metanoetic Imperative (Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press, 1990), 278-9.
35 War and Peace in the Global Village, 136.
The Dutch elm disease which was brought on by an accident 
during research experiments can be defeated at a cost of 
$2,500 per tree, but it require that all of the trees be so treat­
ed. One tree cannot be saved by itself. Is not this somewhat 
like the human condition in general? These self-amputations 
which we call new technologies generate vast new envi­
ronments against which the individual organism is quite help­
less.35
THE SPECIFICITY OF THE GLOBAL VILLAGE
There is much in McLuhan’s presentation, if not everything, that needs
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a second look.36 A comparison with Tanabe’s perspective suggests 
four interlocking questions to me, which I shall lay out as succinctly 
as 1 can. In what follows I shall take the idea of the global village as a 
general expression o f the emerging electronic culture without further 
reference to McLuhan.
First, as a universal ideal, the global village redefines the parameters 
of freedom of knowledge and expression for individuals members of a 
society, but at the same time tends to expropriate or at least greatly 
devalue the local, vernacular culture in whose specificity they find them­
selves incorporated.37 The global village mocks the specificity of the 
vernacular for the “ irrationality” of being “ uninformed” or “ uncon­
nected.” In effect, it denies the ontological parity that Tanabe insisted 
on for the specific and reduces it back to a mere category for classifying 
individuals according to certain secondary traits. It is no accident that 
we see nationalism resurrecting in our day in countries with the most 
advanced consciousness of belonging to the global village. That the 
two are not incompatible suggests that we need to make the same effort 
that Tanabe did in his late work: to reappraise the positive side o f cul­
tural specificity as an antidote to vestiges of nationalism that have poi­
soned the popular imagination since the emergence o f the modern state.
Second, in depreciating locality, the ideal of globality implies that 
certain relationships are more important and more universal because 
less bound to specific cultural conditions, than others. It is a simple mis­
take o f word association to suppose that the global village is global in 
the same sense in which the local village was local. It does not in fact 
embrace the totality o f its members as the tribal village had done. 
Rather, it creates a cross-local, because translocal, aristocracy. The 
world becomes the parish o f electronic media only in the sense that it 
inflicts a parochial specificity on those in the world that it reaches. The
M The only book-length critical treatment o f  his views I know o f is S. D. Neill’s 
Clarifying McLuhan: A n Assessment o f  Product and Product (London: Greenwood 
Press, 1993). It does not, however, deal explicitly with the global village.
”  The phrase vernacular culture is based on Ivan Illich’s idea o f  the “ vernacular 
domain.”  I find it an altogether felicitous phrase, particularly in the context o f  belief in 
a universal language for the global village. But because I am convinced that electronic 
media cannot supplant the bond between cultures and geography, I prefer not to do 
away with talk o f  local culture too hastily. See Shadow Work (London: Marion 
Boyars, 1981), 29-51.
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first universal language may link computers to one another at the level 
of programming code, but it is only by the privilege afforded a limited 
number of vernacular languages that this can in fact take place as adver­
tised. The “ global culture” at whose pillar this universal language is 
erected is as much a virtual, abstract reality as the computer is a virtual, 
abstracting mind.
Tanabe’s perspective questions electronic technology’s claim to true 
universality by alerting us to the negative aspect of the specific, the un­
derlying substrate of specific cultural and social biases that the new 
technologies are said to be forming into a worldwide community. The 
better adjusted one becomes to the rules of human relationship that 
govern the instantaneous exchange of information and opinion, the 
more one becomes a member of the tribe. But no matter how large the 
tribe becomes, and from however many localities it draws, no matter 
what the extent of our recovery of the wisdom and sensibilities of 
preliterate societies, for Tanabe the mere fact of tribalism signals a soci­
ety closed in on itself. In the actual preliterate society, there were no 
grammar mistakes. In the information-intensive society of electronic 
communications, the rules have swollen to proportions that require not 
only a special education to learn but a sophisticated elite to monitor. 
Of necessity the specificity must be closed, and for Tanabe this 
required a belief that the specific is actually universal.
Along with an appreciation of the disappearance and relocation of 
socio-cultural specificity in the global village, Tanabe’s logic raises a 
third question. Perhaps the main reason the web of relations for the 
new village is assumed to be global is that it is spun of a universally 
available thread, in the same weave, and has no hem. In other words, it 
functions like a principle of absolute mediation. The web itself can 
only create in its individuals the sense of tribal belonging by taking 
over the image and likeness of God or Absolute Nothingness. It must 
insure the “ unconditional acceptance” of all its villagers by itself being 
all-knowing, all-present, all-sustaining, all-reliable. Of course, no one 
in their right mind actually divinizes or absolutizes the operations of 
the interconnectedness. But without the assurance that it is at least com­
mitted to aiming at such divine providence, it would be hard to entrust 
oneself to its care.
At the same time, the individual participating in the global village as­
sumes that the exchange of information itself is scientifically neutral,
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value-free, non-moralizing. The network simply provides the “ data” 
for moral decisions that affect the entire tribe. It does not take any deci­
sions itself because it is not a moral agent. The effect is that the glut of 
data anaesthetizes social conscience, which in turn creates the need for 
a priesthood of specialists to sort out the information and determine 
what is relevant to the problems of the day. What remains of moral 
praxis for the mass of persons in this mammoth, borderless, tradi­
tionless tribe is once again restricted to a small circle of immediate 
acquaintances and responsibilities. The religious dimension of social 
existence, which Tanabe envisioned as building up relationships of self­
less love and cooperation, ends up far more restricted than it was prior 
to the emergence of the global village. The function of religious self- 
awareness as the absolute negation of the self-subsistence and self­
empowerment of social existence is unnecessary because it is already dis­
posed of by seeing oneself as a citizen in a global community on whose 
Other-power one relies. The absolute mediation of virtual reality is a 
drug to social conscience: one cannot make decisions without it, one 
cannot make decisions under its influence. In the global village, the 
mass medium has become the opiate of religion.
The perspective of Tanabe’s logic of the specific may not allow us to 
go far beyond the oracular rhetoric of the above remarks. Still, the fact 
that it gets us this far is not insignificant, if only because of the glaring 
absence of overtly religious philosophies in Japan questioning the evan­
gel of technological development and internationalization. Further­
more, there is no other entrance to the forum of world intellectual 
history today than one that takes these questions seriously.
JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY AS WORLD PHILOSOPHY
Viewed from the standpoint of Japan, the admission of its vernacular 
philosophies to the forum of world philosophy carries the primary 
expectation that its vast treasurehouses of wisdom might become the 
rightful inheritance of thinking men and women everywhere. From the 
standpoint of Western philosophy, however, the arrival is greeted first 
of all with the expectation that Japan’s former preoccupations with its 
own uniqueness have given way to the need for bringing other world 
philosophies to bear critically on the tribal dogmas in which that wis­
dom has ordinarily been cast. Neither of these expectations can be met
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without the other, but neither can either be met by mere mutual 
exchange of specialists in one another’s traditions. The two begin rather 
just where Nishitani Keiji says they begin—in rational dialogue:
Dialogue begins not from an undisputed object of faith, not 
from any central dogma, or “ I,” but from a letting go of the 
ego and a submission to reasonableness. . . .  Its spirit is the 
spirit of inquiry and discovery. This spirit is something that 
Eastern dialogue by and large lacks.38
Nishitani attributes this to the absence of a long tradition of rationa­
lity, logic, and method. Though I lack the resources to disagree with 
Nishitani on this score, my own sense of the failure of Japan to enter 
the world forum of intellectual dialogue is that philosophy came to 
Japan without passing through anything like the Enlightenment of the 
West but inherited philosophy directly from the nineteenth century. I 
do not mean that over the past century its philosophers have not prized 
reason and methodical thought every bit as highly as their Western 
counterparts. Nor am I convinced that Japanese intellectual history 
shows overall more dogmatism than the Western. Indeed, its religious 
history is remarkably lacking in the habit of dealing fire and faggot to 
all other viewpoints of which the philosophes of the Enlightenment 
accused the Christian theologians of Europe.
But there is one crucial ingredient from the Enlightenment that is mis­
sing, one that has all but become common sense for the philosophical 
West and without which the whole idea of a world philosophical forum 
would not be possible: the philosophes were cosmopolitan by convic­
tion and by education. Like the ancient Stoics, they exalted the 
interests of humanity as a whole above those of country or clan. 
Japanese thinkers lacked the experience that made it possible for 
Diderot to write to Hume: “ My dear David, you belong to all nations, 
and you’ll never ask an unhappy man for his birth-certificate. I flatter 
myself that I am, like you, citizen of the great city of the world.” 39 The 
conditions under which this question has arisen in Japan were due to 
outside influences, beginning with the prying open of the country in the
” Nishitani Keiji, Nishida KitarO (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1991), 
43.
”  From a letter dated 22 February 1768. Denis Diderot, Correspondence, cd. 
Georges Roth (1955-). 8:16.
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Meiji Era and reaching a climax in the reconstruction of the country 
after the Second World War.
My principal reason for claiming that Tanabe’s logic of the specific 
belongs to world philosophy is that I see it as an attempt to incorporate 
this element of the Enlightenment into rational dialogue. During the 
formative years of his thought, Tanabe’s critique of the specific lacked 
the cultural environment to ripen to full cosmopolitan fruit. Not even 
the liberal atmosphere of the “ Taishd democracy”  could stop it from 
going sour. It was only in his late writings, when the nationalistic edge 
to his logic has worn smooth, that Tanabe recognized how the critique 
of the specific, in essence, meant assuming the standpoint of “ a citizen 
of the great city of the world.”
If it is not entirely out of place for me to do so, I would like to 
conclude by proposing that accepting responsibility for that stand* 
point imposes three obligations on those who count themselves disciples 
of the Kyoto philosophers today. I am aware that in doing so I can 
hardly avoid sounding like a mail-order bride who arrives with a pit­
tance for a dowry but at once starts making demands. Though time 
obliges me to be curt in the saying, my intentions are, I assure you, far 
less than a humble conclusion, a mere word of farewell spoken with one 
foot already out the door.
First is the obligation to encourage philosophy East and West to join 
forum in demystifying the idea of the global village and exposing the 
latent colonialism at its roots. This should be done not from the ethe­
real heights of abstract philanthropy but in that space of “ one inch 
above the ground”  from local, vernacular cultures. Tanabe’s sense 
that philosophy finds its “ vital immediacy” in the sphere of moral ac­
tion must not be allowed to smother under the myths of academic spe­
cialization and value-free reflection.
Second, constructive steps should be taken to train more young 
foreigners in Japanese thought here in Japan. This is not accomplished 
by cutting holes through language and cultural barriers for them to 
crawl through with a minimum of effort. Let the challenge go out, 
however few there are to take it up, that Japan is ready at the end of 
the century to welcome and to cultivate the philosophical ambitions of 
foreign youth in the same spirit that the first generation of idealistic 
Japanese youth were received in Europe at the beginning of it.
Third, efforts to raise the standards of philosophical translation,
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both to and from Japanese, should be given fuller support by the 
philosophical community itself. The ability of translators to move 
beyond the surface of the text and transfer meanings out of their local 
origins and on to the public, world philosophy forum have not kept 
pace with the advances in purely linguistic skills. Without minimizing 
the shock of one specificity encountering another, greater ingenuity is 
needed if philosophical thought is not to suffocate under the misplaced 
sense of duty to technical vocabulary and literalism.
In 1972, ten years after Tanabe’s death, Takizawa Katsumi noted that 
the logic of the specific and the dialectic of absolute mediation had 
been completely forgotten, that not even in Kyoto did one hear talk 
any longer of Tanabe and his philosophy. “ But,” he goes on, “ anyone 
who takes the trouble to plow through his prose will see that the aims 
of that philosophy and the sentiments of that philosopher disclose an 
unexpected depth and touch on the most fundamental questions of our 
own day.” 40 The fact that I stand before you here today, over twenty 
years later, is surely some proof that Takizawa was right. I only hope 
that in time he will have been proved more right.
40 [Collected Works o f Takizawa Katsumi] (Kyoto: HOzOkan, 1972),
1:460.
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